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VOTER'S INTENT AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE 
TO THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE 
PRESIDENCY. By Abner Greene. 1 2001. Pp. 202. 
$19.95 
John Copeland Nagle2 
It seems like everyone has written a book about the 2000 
presidential election. I will content myself with reviewing one of 
them. The choice is easy. Abner Greene's Understanding the 
2000 Election: A Guide to the Legal Battles That Decided the 
Presidency presents the definitive description of the legal battles 
that followed the closing of the polls on Tuesday, November 7.3 
Those battles culminated in the Supreme Court's ruling in Bush 
v. Gore,4 a decision that has already become one of the most vili-
fied in American history. Greene is much more careful and 
measured than most commentators in his account of the Court's 
actions and all of the events that occurred in the five weeks after 
the election, and that is one of the great appeals of his book. 
There are two more reasons why it was the obvious election 
book for me to read. The first reason heeds the intuition of 
many schoolchildren as memorialized by C.S. Lewis: the shortest 
book is the best one to review.5 Second, Abner Greene is a very 
good friend of mine. He voted for Gore, I voted for Bush, but 
I. Professor of Law, Fordham University. 
2. Professor, Notre Dame Law School; nagle.8@nd.edu. Joe Bauer, A.J. Bellia, 
Tricia Bellia, Abner Greene, Lonny Hoffman, Lisa Nagle, Mike Paulsen, and Jay Tid-
marsh provided valuable comments on an earlier draft of this review. I am also grateful 
for the assistance provided by research librarian Patti Ogden, and the research conducted 
by Ryan Carson and Kyle Payne. 
3. Abner Greene, Understanding the 2000 Election: A Guide to the Legal Battles 
That Decided the Presidency (New York U. Press, 2001). 
4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
5. See C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters vi (Macmillan, 1962). Greene's book is 
202 pages, compared to, e.g., the 275 pages of Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: 
How the High Court Hijacked Election 2000 (Oxford U. Press, 2001), and the 266 pages 
of Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the Constitution, and 
the Courts (Princeton U. Press, 2001). 
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our friendship transcends such differences. The special virtue of 
our friendship in this circumstance is that it dissipates whatever 
temptation there could be toward the invective that has charac-
terized so much of the debate about Bush v. Gore and the other 
issues surrounding the election. 
Much has been written about the election in books, law re-
views, popular journals, internet sites, and countless other fo-
rums-with much more commentary to come. It is not my intent 
to survey all of that literature here. Greene provides a compre-
hensive account of the legal battles attending the 2000 presiden-
tial election, and I will review that account here in Part I while 
leaving the rest of the story to others. My contribution to the 
debate concerning the election is to examine what should count 
as a "vote." Greene considers that question throughout his 
book, so I will build upon his discussion first to articulate a nor-
mative standard for counting votes, and second to identify alter-
native explanations for the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore be-
sides partisan politics. 
Five months before election day, in the course of resolving a 
mundane labor law dispute, the Seventh Circuit remarked, "If in 
November a person fails to pull the lever for Al Gore or George 
W. Bush or any of the other presidential candidates, but instead 
scrawls an oblique message on the ballot, no vote will be 
counted. "6 The court spoke too soon. The meaning of the 
oblique message conveyed by indented, hanging, and other lin-
gering chads proved to be critical in the legal battles over the 
election. In Part II, I argue that the determination of what con-
stitutes a "vote" is fraught with difficulty, especially when it 
turns on inferences from ambiguous evidence that are drawn af-
ter an election takes place. That question, in other words, mir-
rors the recent debates about statutory interpretation that dis-
pute the significance of evidence of legislative intent beyond that 
contained in the statutory text itself. Greene describes the ar-
guments for accepting a generalized inquiry into a voter's intent 
as the decisive standard, but he neglects many of the concerns 
that such reliance raises. The alternative approach to reading 
6. Nat'/ Labor Relations Bd. v. Americold Logistics, Inc., 214 F.3d 935, 939 (7th 
Cir. 2000). The case involved an election to determine whether employees of a refriger-
ated warehouse wanted to be represented by the Teamsters, with the union supporters 
prevailing by two votes once the court held that a ballot marked "neither nor" counted 
for neither side. Judge Evans began the court's opinion by observing that "[m]arking an 
X in either the 'yes' or 'no' box of a ballot might not seem like a particularly demanding 
task." ld. at 936. 
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ballots- the approach that corresponds to a textualist theory of 
statutory interpretation-emerges from a less familiar, and quite 
different, state supreme court case deciding another election 
dispute in December 2000.7 The approach to interpreting ballots 
suggested by that case and from the analogy to statutory inter-
pretation emphasizes the dual need to avoid speculating about 
voter's intent and "to insure a standard of objectivity in our elec-
tion process. "8 
Discontent with the Florida Supreme Court's approach to 
effectuating the intent of the voters resulted in Bush v. Gore. 
But the widespread dissatisfaction with the reasoning contained 
in the United States Supreme Court's per curiam opinion has 
been accompanied by a quick assumption that partisan bias is 
the only possible explanation for the Court's decision. In Part 
Ill, I describe how Greene first concludes that the rationale of 
the per curiam opinion is plausible, and then proceeds to offer 
his own compelling First Amendment theory to justify the result 
in Bush v. Gore. I continue by offering three of my own possible 
explanations for why the Court did what it did, any of which 
suggests that it is improper to assume that the Court acted for 
partisan reasons. Finally, in Part IV, I conclude by wholeheart-
edly commending Greene's concluding chapter on how the rule 
of law triumphed in the election. 
I. GREENE'S ACCOUNT OF THE 2000 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Greene is well qualified to write about the legal issues 
raised by the 2000 presidential election. His prior work has ex-
plored numerous constitutional and statutory questions that bear 
upon the kinds of institutional and interpretive issues raised by 
the election.9 His specific expertise on the election was recog-
nized by many national media sources that relied upon his in-
sights as the events were unfolding. 10 
7. See Paulsen v. Huestis, 13 P.3d 931 (Mont. 2000), discussed infra at text accom-
panying notes 36-41. 
8. ld. at 934 (quoting Spaeth v. Kendall, 801 P.2d 591,593 (Mont. 1990)). 
9. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2000); 
Abner S. Greene, The Work of Knowledge, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1479 (1997); Abner 
S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
123 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Adjudicative Retroactivity in Administrative Law, 1991 S. 
Ct. Rev. 261. 
10. See Greene, Understanding the 2000 Election at 202 (cited in note 3) (noting 
that Greene "made more than eighty appearances in a wide array of television, radio, 
and newspaper venues [during the resolution of the 2000 election]. He became the ABC 
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The book that Greene wrote is wonderfully clear and dis-
passionate. He succeeds completely in his effort to explain all of 
the legal issues surrounding the election, not just the Court's de-
cision in Bush v. Gore. He begins by describing the role of the 
electoral college in selecting the President. He then reviews the 
many aspects of the manual recounts of the punch card ballots 
that featured in the decisions of the numerous courts-including 
the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court-that considered the meaning of a legal vote, the Florida 
statutory schemes for protesting and contesting the election, the 
federal statutory scheme for selecting presidential electors, and 
the federal Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under 
the law. He analyzes the disputes surrounding the butterfly bal-
lot employed in Palm Beach County and the absentee ballots in 
Seminole and Martin Counties. And Greene sketches the laws 
governing the role that the Florida legislature and the United 
States Congress could have played in deciding the election. 
Throughout, Greene proceeds with fairness to the arguments of 
each party, avoiding the hyperbolic accusations that character-
ized much of the public debate at the time and much of the aca-
demic response to its conclusion. This dispassionate approach is 
one of the book's signal virtues. 
The legal battles themselves were anything but dispassion-
ate. Much of the passion generated by the election can be ex-
plained by its stakes. Bush supporters and Gore supporters truly 
believed that the good of the nation depended on their chosen 
candidate becoming President. But there is another explanation 
for the passion displayed in those legal battles. Both candidates 
believed that they had really won the election. The primary rea-
son for Gore's belief was the thousands of voters who were ap-
parently confused by the "butterfly ballot" employed in Palm 
Springs County. As Greene explains, "[t]he claim of the dis-
mayed Democratic voters-that thousands of them went to the 
polling place [in Palm Beach County] to vote for Gore, but those 
votes were never registered- was always at the emotional core 
of Gore's argument that he had really won Florida." (p. 137) 
Gore's belief that he had won the election also stemmed from 
his more than 500,000 vote victory in the nationwide popular 
vote and from allegations of misconduct that prevented voters-
especially African-American voters-from reaching the polls in 
News Radio regular legal analyst, appeared on ABC World News Tonight, CNN, NPR 
Talk of the Nation, and C-SPAN and was quoted on several occasions in the New York 
Times."). 
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Florida. Bush, by contrast, emphasized that the one objective 
means of counting the votes in Florida indicated that he won 
more votes than Gore, and that any subsequent manual counting 
was subject to purposeful or unintentional manipulation by the 
people charged with doing the counting. Conversely, each can-
didate viewed his opponent as trying to steal the election from 
him. Gore saw Bush as seeking to avoid the counting of the 
votes that would prove that Gore was the rightful winner of the 
election. Bush saw Gore as manipulating the recount procedure 
to manufacture enough "votes" to overcome the lead that Bush 
had gained through the one objective counting of the ballots. 
Whatever the merits of their respective positions, each candidate 
and his supporters were convinced that he had won Florida (and 
thus the election) and that his opponent was scheming to deprive 
him of that victory. The legal battles that followed evidenced 
those passionate beliefs. 
Greene reviews those battles in the book's five parts: (1) the 
nature of manual recounts, both generally and specifically in 
Florida; (2) the Bush objections to the decisions of the Florida 
Supreme Court that directed such recounts; (3) the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore stopping the 
recounts ordered by the Florida Supreme Court; (4) the "wild-
card lawsuits" involving Palm Beach County's butterfly ballot 
and the mismanaged absentee ballot applications in Seminole 
and Martin Counties; and (5) the possible legislative responses 
by the Florida legislature to name its own slate of electors and by 
the United States Congress to decide who should serve as Presi-
dent. That organization nicely captures the building drama con-
cerning the manual counting of ballots before turning to the 
other legal issues that could have determined the election. I will 
take a different approach here, though, which moves through the 
details of how we choose the President. 
The Constitution directs the electoral college to select the 
President. Greene explains the compromises that led the Fram-
ers to seize upon that method for choosing the nation's chief ex-
ecutive, and he relates Alexander Hamilton's subsequent 
"smashing piece of political rhetoric" that offered a principled 
defense of that compromise. (p. 20) Greene also describes the 
many criticisms that have confronted that system over the years, 
especially in the four elections (including the 2000 election) 
where the winner of the popular vote failed to win in the elec-
toral college. Greene allows that the electoral college "does 
seem mighty strange," (p. 18) and he offers some modest pro-
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posals for changing that system even if the electoral college is re-
tained.'' 
As an aside, Greene's description of the ways of choosing 
the President overlooks another option with which he is familiar. 
In the 1960's, Milton Bradley produced "Landslide," a board 
game simulating the election of the President that I have played 
with Greene many times. 12 The game is pretty faithful to the 
constitutional structure, though it does take certain artistic liber-
ties. The players-like the real candidates-compete for the 
electoral votes of each of the fifty states. Reapportionment has 
not caught up with my copy of the game, so the electoral votes 
contributed by each state are frozen in the 1970's. That gives 
Florida 17 votes instead of the 25 votes that it has had since 1990 
or the 27 votes it now receives thanks to the results of the 2000 
census. 13 To win the game, a player must obtain more electoral 
votes than any other player. This is a bit different than the win-
ner described in the Constitution who must obtain a majority of 
all of the electoral votes lest he or she become subject to the 
whims of the House of Representatives. "Auctions" for each 
state are won by the candidate who expends "vote" cards that 
are eerily similar to money, thus prefiguring the contemporary 
debates over campaign finance reform. The game also contains 
a few nifty features that are unfortunately absent from the actual 
election process. A player landing on the "Secret Ballot" space 
triggers an "auction" for four states at once that can yield as 
many as 131 electoral votes but as few as twelve. The most valu-
able "Politics" card allows a player to simply take a state of up to 
twenty electoral votes from any opponent. Imagine Vice Presi-
dent Gore saying, "Governor Bush, I will take North Carolina 
(with its thirteen electoral votes) from you, thank you very 
much." My favorite Politics card is aptly named "Gamble," for 
it enables a player to pit one of his or her states against any state 
of an equal or lesser value held by an opposing player, with the 
high roll of the dice winning both states. Alas, a similar card is 
not available to candidates during the real election. 
II. His two suggestions are to have each state split its electors in accordance with 
each candidate's popular vote (as is done to some extent in Maine and Nebraska) and to 
require each elector to vote for the candidate to which he or she is pledged. (pp. 25-26) 
12. The game is now out of print, but it can be purchased onE-Bay for about $15. 
13. As an aside to this aside, note that Bush would have collected an additional 
seven electoral votes if the results of the 2000 census had been in place for the 2000 elec-
tion. Cf. William Schneider, Population Shifts Favor GOP, Nat'l J. 1134 (Apr. 14, 2001) 
(reporting that the states carried by Bush will gain eleven electoral votes while losing 
four, and the states carried by Gore will gain one electoral vote while losing eight). 
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Greene gives you the impression that replacing the electoral 
college is no more likely than determining the presidency by 
playing Landslide. As he notes, there is little chance that the 
smaller states will surrender the exaggerated importance that 
they enjoy in the electoral college. (p. 25) Perhaps more sur-
prisingly, the 2000 election failed to generate much effort to dis-
card the electoral college. Yet, as Greene reminds, the electoral 
college will not always choose the President. If no candidate re-
ceives the votes of a majority of the electors, then a few other 
scenarios could come into play. Greene observes that "[t]he 
framers of the Constitution envisioned an active role for Con-
gress in choosing a president." (p. 168) He concludes that Bush 
would have prevailed under any of the scenarios involving con-
gressional action once Florida failed to submit its electors by the 
safe-harbor date established by 3 U.S.C. § 5. (pp. 169-76) As 
Greene admits, that assertion assumes that each member of 
Congress would have voted for his or her party's candidate, (p. 
174) an assumption that is questionable given the contrary 
statement made by Maryland Republican Representative Con-
nie Morella even before the presumably enormous pressure 
would have been brought to bear on Senators and Representa-
tives who often stray from their party's line or who represent ju-
risdictions dominated by the opposing party. 14 But even if Bush 
was bound to win once the election reached Congress, Dick 
Cheney was not as certain to become Vice President. Greene 
describes how the Twelfth Amendment could have enabled 
Gore to cast the tie-breaking vote in the Senate for Joseph Lie-
berman, thereby producing a "President Bush, Vice President 
Lieberman" result that Greene suggests "would have been the 
fairest outcome." (p. 176) 
The primacy of the electoral college in choosing the Presi-
dent demonstrates the importance of deciding how to choose the 
electors. Twentieth century voters learned to simply assume that 
electors are selected by popular vote. Greene reminds us that 
the mode of selectinR electors still lies within the discretion of 
the state legislature. (pp. 163-64) A few state legislatures 
14. See Karen Hosler, Republican Morella Plans to Back Gore if Forced to Pick 
Next President; Crossover Would Decide Vote Representing Md., Baltimore Sun 17 A 
(Nov. 15, 2000). 
15. Greene also writes that "[n]o one disputes that the Florida legislature could, by 
law applicable to future elections, alter the state's 'manner' of selecting electors." (pp. 
163-64) For an argument that comes close to creating such a dispute, see Harold Meyer-
son, W. Stands for Wrongful, LA Weekly 20 (Dec. 8, 2000), reprinted in E.J. Dionne, Jr. 
and William Kristol, eds., Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 242-45 
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chose electors themselves as late as the second half of the nine-
teenth century, 16 but none have done it since then. Greene sug-
gests that a state legislature could act unilaterally if it had the 
"guts" to do so, (p. 164) but bravery seems an unlikely quality to 
explain how that could occur. A different motivation- the fear 
that the state's courts were stealing the election for Gore-
animated the Florida legislature's move to select its own slate of 
electors. But the legislature's actions were greatly complicated 
by the facts that Florida law had authorized a popular election 
for the selection of electors and that such an election had been 
held on November 7. Even so, 3 U.S.C. § 2 allows a state legisla-
ture to appoint presidential electors "[w]henever any State has 
held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has 
failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law." Greene 
correctly concludes that the Florida legislature improperly read 
the "day prescribed by law" as the safe harbor date, when that 
phrase actually refers to election day. (p. 165) He allows, 
though, that at some point the Florida legislature might have 
been empowered to act to appoint electors, though he does not 
resolve when that point would be. (pp. 166-67) 
Such hypotheticals should not obscure the unanimity with 
which state legislatures today rely upon a popular election to de-
termine presidential electors. The reason why Florida experi-
enced such difficulty in selecting its electors was not because of a 
rarified debate about constitutional theory, but because of much 
more mundane disagreements about the counting of the popular 
vote. Florida's vote counting problem centered on three types of 
ballots: (1) ballots that were clearly marked, but that were alleg-
edly improperly obtained by the voter; (2) ballots that were 
clearly marked, but that the voter mistakenly marked for the 
wrong candidate; and (3) ballots that were not clearly marked by 
the voter. Again, Greene plainly describes each controversy. 
The first group of troublesome ballots arose in Seminole 
and Martin Counties, where some voters submitted applications 
for absentee ballots that failed to include the voter's registration 
number as required by Florida statute. This omission was reme-
died by Republican Party workers whom the county election of-
ficials allowed to fill in the missing numbers, which in turn led 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2001) (sharply criticizing the contention that there is no 
popular right to vote for the President). . . 
16. See Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Electoral College 64 (1958) (explammg that 
between 1836 and the 1860, "the choice of Electors was by general ticket in every state 
except South Carolina, where it was by the legislature"). 
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local Democrats to challenge the resulting ballots. The legal 
question thus was not what the voter intended to do, but 
whether he or she was entitled to cast a vote in the first place. 
Greene takes these cases seriously, even suggesting that the dis-
pute "nearly cost George W. Bush the election." (p. 151) As he 
explains, though, "the violations turned out to be more like a 
technical error than fraud," and thus the Florida courts refused 
to invalidate the ballots cast bX the voters despite the way in 
which they obtained the ballots. 7 (p. 159) 
The second vote counting question in Florida involved bal-
lots in which the actions of the voter were clear, but arguably un-
intended. Such was the case in Palm Beach County, where thou-
sands of voters complained that they misread the famous 
butterfly ballot and mistakenly voted for Patrick Buchanan in-
stead of Al Gore. Here Greene is not as thorough as he is in the 
rest of the book. He does not mention the common use of simi-
lar ballots throughout the nation,18 the strong showing that Bu-
chanan had made in the county in previous elections, 19 or the 
consistent case law from other jurisdictions holding that post-
election objections to the format of a ballot cannot invalidate an 
election?0 Greene recognizes the enormous remedial problems 
associated with any attempt to respond to the concerns of con-
fused voters, but his "strong argument that the butterfly ballot 
violated Florida law" in the first instance is not especially per-
suasive. (p. 144) Greene's compelling account of the emotional 
distress that the ballot caused many unsuspecting Palm Beach 
County voters (pp. 140-41) should not color what was actually an 
easy case as a matter of well-settled election law. 
The third vote counting problem concerned the ballots that 
failed to clearly indicate whom (if anyone) the voter selected. 
17. See generally Adkins v. Huckabay, 755 So.2d 206, 216 (La. 2000) (reviewing 
decisions and concluding that "[t]he majority of states ... have concluded that the absen-
tee voting laws should be liberally construed in aid of the right to vote"). 
18. See, e.g., Douglas Holt and Evan Osnos, Chicago No Stranger to Florida Ballot 
Woes, Chi. Trib. 1, 17 (Nov. 10, 2000) (picturing the butterfly ballot used for the Novem-
ber 2000 Cook County judicial election). 
19. See John J. Miller, "The Campaign Continues": Gore in Florida, Step by Awful 
Step, Nat'! Rev. (Dec. 18, 2000) (noting that "Buchanan won only eight-tenth of 1 per-
cent of the Palm Beach total, which was comparable to his rate of support in other coun-
ties; and he had received more than twice as many votes in Palm Beach during the 1996 
presidential primary, even though he never campaigned there"); Donna Ladd, Buchanan 
Country, Village Voice 29 (Nov. 28, 2000) (describing Buchanan's support in Palm Beach 
County). 
20. See generally 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 316 (1996) (describing the conse-
quences of the use of improper ballots). 
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These were the various punch card ballots that Gore wanted to 
manually recount. This saga dominated the legal battles that 
culminated in Bush v. Gore, and it dominates Greene's book as 
well. The underlying problem, of course, was ascertaining the 
meaning of punch card ballots on which no "chad" had been 
punched out for any presidential candidate, and especially those 
ballots on which the chad was partially dislodged or indented. 
The legal dispute concerning those ballots raised novel questions 
about Florida's statutory scheme for counting and recounting 
votes, contesting and protesting election results, and identifying 
when those actions should be taken and by whom. The legal 
dispute spilled over into the federal courts, where the equal pro-
tection clause finally resolved the vote counting in Bush v. Gore. 
Greene carefully explains each of the legal issues that con-
fronted the counting of votes in Florida. His writing is clear, his 
analysis thorough, and his portrayal remarkably free from bias. 
He is willing to say when an argument fails to impress him, as 
evidenced by his frequent characterization of Bush's argument 
that the Florida Supreme Court legislated instead of interpreted 
as "weak." (pp. 89, 94, 127) My few disagreements with his ac-
count are sufficiently minor to deserve mention only in a foot-
note.21 In the end, Greene concludes that "[r]easons were given 
that were defensible from statutory text or judicial precedent; 
opposing views were canvassed and rejected through argument; 
difficult questions were resolved by reference to principle, rather 
than politics." (pp. 182-83) Greene presents those reasons, 
views, and questions so thoroughly that one almost wonders 
what all the fuss was about. 
II. BALLOT INTERPRETATION 
The question that pervaded the legal battles in Florida was 
what counts as a vote. Gore insisted that all votes should count; 
Bush worried that the manual recount would identify "votes" 
21. My leading quibbles are these: (1) Greene casually notes that the Florida Su-
preme Court enjoined the certification of the election "on its own motion" (p. 49) with-
out indicating how unprecedented it was for a court to take such a dramatic step that was 
unsought by any party; (2) Greene finds "a deep irony" in both Bush and Gore alter-
nately advocating and opposing literal readings of different parts of Florida election law, 
(p. 62) but his description of those interpretive arguments fails to support the claim that 
Bush ever departed from a preference for a literal reading of the relevant statutes; (3) 
Greene says that the Court is "generally divided between five so-called conservative Jus-
tices and four so-called liberal Justices," (p. 103) which exaggerates the many recent in-
stances in which the Court's decisional lineup is unpredictable (see, e.g., Richard Gar-
nett, Disrobed! Actually, They Think For Themselves, Wash. Post B2 (July 1, 2001)). 
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that were imaginary. The general rule, as Greene explains, is 
that "every vote should be counted, if possible." (p. 31) The "if 
possible" caveat, of course, begs the question of what would 
make the counting of a vote impossible. One obstacle is the fail-
ure of the voter to abide by the rules governing the election, 
such as failing to register to vote, showing up at the polling place 
on the wrong day, or selecting more candidates than he or she is 
allowed. Another type of obstacle to counting a vote-and the 
one disputed in Florida-is an inability to determine the mean-
ing of the voter's ballot. The "perfect" ballot has yet to be in-
vented: controversies involving paper ballots, punch card ballots, 
and optically scanned ballots all feature in the reported cases.22 
State election law can explain what counts as a vote. 
Greene cites the example of Texas, where Governor Bush ap-
proved a statute providing that punch card ballots yield votes if 
"at least two corners of the chad are detached," or "light is visi-
ble through the hole," or "an indentation on the chad ... is pre-
sent and indicates a clearly ascertainable intent of the voter to 
vote," or "the chad reflects by other means a clearly ascertain-
able intent of the voter to vote." (p. 36) Another example is of-
fered by Palm Beach County, which once provided that "[a] 
chad that is fully attached, bearing only an indentation, should 
not be counted as a vote."23 Absent such specific provisions, the 
general rule is that whether or not a ballot contains a "vote" de-
pends upon the intent of the voter. Florida follows this rule. 
Greene describes the Florida statutory provisions instructing 
election officials to seek a "clear indication of the intent of the 
22. Sec, e.g., Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585 (Ill. 1990) (counting punch card 
ballots with indented chads); Spaeth v. Kendall, 801 P.2d 591 (Mont. 1999) (refusing to 
count improperly marked optically scanned ballots); Brereton v. Bd. of Canvassers of 
Warwick, 177 A. 147 (R.I. 1934) (refusing to count paper ballots on which the voter drew 
a shoe and an animal's head). See also Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers 
for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 658 n.7 (2001) (noting that "significant numbers 
of Democratic voters" failed to properly complete an optically scanned ballot because 
they "both darkened the circle for Gore on the ballot and wrote his name as a write-in"); 
Ed Bouchctte, Tails of Woe: Steelers Flipped Out Over Bizarre Loss to Lions, Pittsburgh 
Post-Gazette, Nov. 27, 1998 (describing how a referee mistakenly believed that a player 
called "heads" instead of "tails" for a coin toss). 
23. Guidelines on Ballots with Chads Not Completely Removed, Adopted by the 
Nov. 6, 1990 Canvassing Bd., quoted in Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Leg-
islature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
613, 618 (2001); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 637, 
645 (2001) (observing that the 1990 Palm Beach County rules "were fairly clearly abro-
gated in the rush to accommodate claims of voter error and defective voting machines in 
Election 2000"). Indiana has a similar standard. See Ind. Code§ 3-12-1-9.5 (providing 
that indented chads do not count as votes), cited in Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1191 
(11th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (Birch, J, dissenting). 
494 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:483 
voter" or simply "the voter's intent," noting the potentialll im-
portant difference between those two standards. (p. 33)2 As 
the Florida Supreme Court majority explained in its 4-3 contest 
phase decision, a "legal" vote exists if a ballot provides "a clear 
indication of the intent of the voter." (p. 64) Beyond that, the 
Florida courts "refus[ed] to say anything more about how to as-
certain the intent of the voter." (p. 34) 
But how to determine such intent? Here the dispute in 
Florida mirrors recent academic debates about statutory inter-
pretation. In most instances, the text and other evidence of leg-
islative intent point in the same direction, so the choice of inter-
pretive theories does not matter. But the statutory text conflicts 
with legislative history, the statute's purpose, and other indica-
tions of legislative intent in a number of memorable cases.25 
Textualist and intentionalist theories yield different results in 
any such case where the meaning of the statutory text conflicts 
with other evidence of legislative intent. Textualism insists that 
the plain meaning of statutory language must prevail even if 
there is contrary evidence that the legislature actually intended 
that statute to mean something else. Intentionalist theories, by 
contrast, are much more willing to honor a variety of indicia of 
legislative intent even if that yields a result that conflicts with the 
apparent command of the statutory language.26 
Each approach offers its own justifications. For intentional-
ists, what the legislature meant to accomplish should be decisive 
when interpreting the statutes that the legislature enacted. Rely-
ing upon traditional agency principles, defenders of intentional-
ism posit that the courts should act as the agent on behalf of the 
24. See Greene, Understanding the 2000 Election at 202 (cited in note 3), quoting 
Fla. Stat.§ 102.166(4)(a) (manual recount provision directing officials to determine "the 
voter's intent"); Fla Stat. § 102.166(4)(c) (directing that "damaged or defective" should 
be counted "if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter"). The statute has since 
been amended. Sec Fla. Stat.§ 102.166(2002). 
25. Sec, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (reading 
Title VII to permit voluntary affirmative action programs); Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (interpreting the Endangered Species Act to prevent the com-
pletion of the Tellico Dam); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 143 U.S. 457 
(1892) (holding that a New York City church could hire an English pastor despite a fed-
eral law prohibiting the importation of any alien into the United States under a previous 
agreement to perform labor in the United States); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (holding that statutory language prohibiting certain bankruptcy 
conversions trumps a precisely contrary statement in the legislative history). 
26. For an overview of the theoretical debate concerning statutory interpretation, 
sec generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., PhilipP. Frickey and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and 
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 669-816 (West Group, 
3d ed. 2001). 
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legislature-the principal-whose commands the court seeks to 
obey. So if the legislature failed to anticipate an exceptional 
case or used language that is less than clear, then the courts 
should place the le~islature's interests above strict adherence to 
statutory language. 7 Similarly, the legislature should not be 
punished by the courts for failing to make its intent clear in the 
statutory text. 
For textualists, adherence to the plain language of the stat-
ute is essential. The legislature's intent must be manifested in 
the text that emerges from the legislative process in order for 
that intent to be effectuated. In Oliver Wendell Holmes's 
memorable words, "We do not inquire what the legislature 
meant; we ask only what the statute means."28 Textualists also 
worry about the consequences of seeking legislative intent as an 
end in itself. Legislative intent is routinely questioned as specu-
lative, with no sure way of knowing what the legislature meant 
besides the statutory text that survived the considerable constitu-
tional hurdles for the enactment of legislation. And the ambigu-
ity of legislative intent fails to provide a meaningful constraint 
on those seeking to interpret a statute. As Judge Leventhal once 
remarked about legislative history, it is "the equivalent of enter-
ing a crowded cocktail J:>arty and looking over the heads of the 
guests for one's friends." 29 
So too with ballots. Bush's "textualist" approach to reading 
punch card ballots sought to limit consideration to the hole 
punched out of the ballot, or at least two of the corners of the 
chad were displaced. (p. 71) He worried that any inference 
from indented chads was inevitably speculative, and that an offi-
cial charged with interpreting the chads could reach whatever 
conclusion he or she desired. Gore's "intentionalist" approach 
to reading those ballots encouraged election officials to examine 
each ballot in an effort to ascertain the intent of the voter. Thus 
Gore would have allowed a ballot containing even a dimpled 
chad to count as a vote because that dimple indicated what the 
voter intended to do: punch out the chad. He emphasized that 
the voter's intent should be the standard in order to properly ef-
fectuate the franchise upon which the nation depends, and that 
27. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 123-25 (Harvard 
U. Press, 1994) (critically analyzing the agency metaphor for statutory interpretation). 
28. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 
417,419 (1899). 
29. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting Judge Leventhal). 
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the officials reviewing the ballots should act as each voter's agent 
to achieve that end. (pp. 32-33) The Florida Supreme Court 
agreed with Gore, extolling the virtues of its inquiry into the in-
tent of each voter.30 
But voter's intent has never been the ultimate interpretive 
standard, even in Florida. Consider Palm Beach County: thou-
sands of voters insisted that they intended to vote for Gore, but 
the marks on their butterfly ballots indicated that they voted for 
Buchanan. If voter's intent was decisive, then the votes should 
have been recorded for Gore despite the contrary plain meaning 
of the ballots. Yet the Florida state courts refused to switch 
those votes from Buchanan to Gore (or to provide any other 
remedy), though Greene rightly notes that the courts failed to 
explain why. (p. 146) And the voter intent problem is not lim-
ited to Palm Beach County. Surely there are voters throughout 
Florida, and throughout the United States, who accidentally 
punched out the wrong chad-or pulled the wrong lever, or 
placed an "X" in the wrong place-and thus submitted a ballot 
that reflected an incorrect reflection of their intent in voting. 
Going a step further, an aggressive intent standard could even 
consider the many individuals who "intended" to vote on elec-
tion day but were prevented from doing so by registration re-
quirements, confusion about the time or place to vote, or the 
weather.31 
Ideally, the solution in such cases would be for the voter to 
explain the mistake once it is discovered, and to have the voter's 
true intent counted in the vote totals. Voters commonly make 
such corrections if they recognize the error before they submit 
30. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1256 (Fla. 2000) (referring to "the long-
standing case law and statutory law that the intent of the voter is of paramount concern 
and should always be given effect if the intent can be determined"), rev'd, Bush v. Gore, 
531 u.s. 98 (2000). 
31. Both presidential candidates claim that they lost votes in this way. Compare 
David Gonzalez, African-Americans Seek Inquiry Into Rorida Vote, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 
2000, reprinted in Douglas Brinkley, 36 Days: The Complete Chronicle of the 2000 Presi-
dential Election Crisis 36-38 (Times Books, 2001) (reporting allegations that some Afri-
can-Americans in Florida were not allowed to vote because they were not listed as regis-
tered voters) with Peter Marks, ABC Tightens Its Rules on Declaring Winners, N.Y. 
Times 34 (Nov. 23, 2000) (noting that television networks projected Gore the winner in 
Florida before the polls closed in a dozen counties in the state's panhandle within the 
central time zone, and reporting that "Bush campaign officials argue that the projection 
depressed their turnout in those counties in the closing minutes, and those votes might 
have been decisive"); Loie Fecteau, Snow Favored Gore in New Mexico, Albuquerque J. 
B2 (Dec. 17, 2000) (describing how an election day snowstorm prevented voters from 
reaching the polls in Republican parts of New Mexico, a state Gore won by 366 votes, the 
closest margin of any state in the country). 
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their ballot while they are still in the polling place. Once submit-
ted, though, votes cannot be changed. That is the rule in other 
contexts, too. Legislators are not allowed to correct a mistaken 
vote for proposed legislation a few days after the bill passed. 
Nor can judges rescind their votes in a case once the decision is 
final. 
Any effort to divine voter's intent after election day despite 
such precedent is greatly complicated by the use of secret bal-
lots. If ballots were marked with an identification number, then 
it would be possible for election officials to compare the marking 
on the ballot with the claims of the voter who marked the ballot, 
and then to either assure the voter that the ballot accurately re-
flected the voter's intent or to change the ballot to do so. Even 
this system would be problematic, though, for it could facilitate 
strategic behavior by voters who would have preferred to have 
voted for a different candidate once the results of the voting are 
made public. As one court defended the rule against counting 
the subsequent statement of an individual who was wrongfully 
prevented from voting on election day: 
[I]t would be an uncertain and dangerous experiment to at-
tempt the task of ascertaining and giving effect to their inten-
tions as ballots actually cast and returned. Uncertain, because 
it would be simply a matter of speculation; dangerous, be-
cause it would give to such electors the power of determining 
the result of an election in a close contest. All that it would 
be necessary for them to do, in such a case, to decide the elec-
tion, would be to declare that they intended to vote for a par-
ticular candidate. It would enable them to sell the office to 
the candidate cffering the highest price for it, because they 
would not be called upon for their declaration until a contest 
arose, after the actual ballots had been counted, and the pre-
cise effect of their statement known. They could swear falsely 
as to their past intention, without fear of punishment, for how 
would it be possible to disprove their statements as to their in-
tentions with reference to a supposed act, if perchance they 
had acted?32 
More recently, the 97,488 Floridians who voted for Ralph Nader 
presumably had serious second-thoughts about the wisdom of 
32. Martin v. McGarr, 117 P. 323, 328 (Okla. 1910). See also McNally v. Bd. of 
Canvassers of Wayne County, 25 N.W.2d 613, 617 (Mich. 1947) (asserting that "[j]udges 
of election and courts should not be required to spend their time in endeavoring to ascer-
tain what the intention of the elector was in depositing his ballot, except so far as he has 
expressed that intention in the manner by the methods prescribed by the lawmaking 
power"). 
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their choice once the importance of the vote totals in Florida be-
came known. 
In any event, Florida employs secret ballots. Any voter's 
subsequent claim of a "mistaken" vote, therefore, cannot be ac-
curately judged. Greene recognizes this problem, albeit in his 
discussion of butterfly ballots, when he observes that the use of 
affidavits "raises enormous problems regarding voter memory 
(can a voter who intended to vote for Gore clearly remember 
that he or she actually punched for Buchanan?) and voter fraud 
(false affidavits)." (p. 146) In fact, there are a few old cases 
from the Pennsylvania courts in which voters were allowed to 
explain their write-in ballots after an election had occurred,33 but 
I have been unable to find any other instances of similar post-
election voter explanations of intent being accepted by the 
courts. As one writer observed, "it is often illegal, if not impos-
sible, to identify a particular voter with a particular ballot. "34 
Thus Greene is wrong to assume that every ballot with the 
chad punched out presents an "easy" case. (p. 71) If the voter's 
intent is dispositive, then the voter's explanation that he or she 
meant to vote for a different candidate should trump the chad 
missing from the ballot. In statutory interpretation terms, the 
voting history should prevail against the plain meaning of the 
ballot itself. But that is not the law in Florida, or anywhere else. 
The questionable punch card ballots in Florida did not pre-
sent such a contrast because the marks on the ballots were un-
clear and the voters were not available to explain them. This 
was especially true for the punch card ballots whose presidential 
chads were indented, hanging, or swinging. Imagine the reasons 
why the chads on a ballot are marked or partially removed, but 
still attached to the ballot: (1) the voter meant to vote for the 
candidate corresponding to the chad, but the voter failed to 
punch the desired chad out; (2) the voter changed his or her 
mind at the last minute, an explanation that is particularly plau-
sible for so-called overvotes (i.e., ballots on which the voter se-
lected more than one candidate for an office); (3) the voter hit 
the chad by mistake, an explanation that brings to mind the 
voter confusion that abounded in Palm Beach County; or (4) the 
chad was indented or partially dislodged after the voter submit-
33. See Annotation, Validity of Write-In Vote Where Candidate's Surname Only is 
Written in on Ballot, 86 A.L.R.2d 1025, 1031-32 (1962) (citing three Pennsylvania cases 
decided between 1881 and 1937 in which the court considered the testimony of intentions 
of voters). 
34. Id. at 1031. 
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ted the ballot, perhaps by a misfunctioning machine or an elec-
tion official.35 The common assumption is that the first explana-
tion-that any mark on the chad of a punch card ballot is ex-
plained by a voter's failed attempt to displace the chad 
corresponding to his or her chosen candidate-is the best. This 
assumption is embodied in election law cases decided by federal 
and state courts across the country that permitted the counting 
of dimpled and hanging chads because of the need l.o count 
every vote that a voter intended to cast. Greene cites several 
such cases, (pp. 37-42) which serve to justify an intentionalist ap-
proach to reading ballots. What is missing from Greene's ac-
count is an explanation why a textualist approach to reading bal-
lots might make sense instead. 
That answer was provided during the five weeks that the le-
gal battle was raging in Florida, but it was offered in Helena, not 
Tallahassee. On December 1, 2000, the Montana Supreme 
Court resolved a disputed election that had elicited scant na-
tional attention.36 The case arose in Blaine County, a remote 
part of north central Montana bordering Saskatchewan whose 
6,700 residents are spread across 3,500 square miles. Glenn 
Huestis served as county sheriff between 1985 and 1991, then 
Theron Peter Paulsen- better known as Pete Paulsen- took his 
job. Huestis wanted his old job back, and in the spring of 1998 
he defeated Paulsen in the Democratic Party primary. Unde-
terred, Paulsen mounted a write-in campaign for the general 
election. The morning after election day found Huestis leading 
Paulsen 1,216 to 1,213, a lead that grew to nineteen votes follow-
ing a recount requested by Paulsen.37 
Paulsen claimed that the election officials had failed to 
count 37 write-in ballots that had been cast for him. Those bal-
lots were marked "Paulson," "Paulsen," "Pat Paulsen," "Pat 
Paulson," and "Peter Theron Paulsen." Pete Paulsen insisted 
that the voters who cast those ballots intended to vote for him, 
35. For a Jess gracious explanation of the potentially related problem of undervotes, 
see Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
719, 722 (2001) (writing that "[b]ecause the undercounted votes were only a small frac-
tion of the total number of votes cast, it would not be surprising if a large fraction of 
them had been cast by undecided, confused, clumsy, inexperienced, or illiterate voters"). 
36. Paulsen v. Huestis, 13 P.3d 931 (Mont. 2000). 
37. See id. at 932-33 for further description of the facts of the case. Sec also Court 
Upholds Sheriffs Victory, Billings Gazette, Nov. 15, 2000, available at <http: 
llwww. billingsgaze tte .com/archive. ph p?displa y=rednews/2000111/15/build/locai/Osheriff. in 
c>; Former Blaine County Sheriff Pete Paulsen Has Asked ... , Associated Press, Jan. 16, 
1999, available at 1999 WL 3109416; Tuesday's Recount in the Blaine County Sheriffs ... , 
Associated Press, Nov. 11, 1998, available at 1998 WL 7464910. 
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the only Paulsen who mounted a campaign for sheriff, the only 
Paulsen who had previously served as sheriff, and one of only 
nine individuals named "Paulsen" or "Paulson" in the entire 
county. Montana's election code, however, requires a voter us-
ing a write-in ballot to include "the candidate's first and last 
names" and to use a form of the candidate's name that the can-
didate had submitted in a declaration of intent to seek election.38 
The 37 contested ballots were not counted because they did not 
comply with the statutory instructions. So Paulsen challenged 
the election in court. 
The Montana Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
Paulsen's claim. It explained that it had "consistently ruled that 
ballots that do not clearly express the intent of the voter will be 
disallowed. "39 It then provided the reason for such a clear 
statement rule: 
The paramount and ultimate object of all election laws under 
our system of government is to obtain an honest and fair ex-
pression from the voters upon all questions submitted to 
them. When such expression cannot be gleaned without specu-
lation, however, the vote is to be voided, to insure a standard of 
objectivity in our election process.40 
The exclusion of the ballots obviously bothered the court, but it 
suggested that any blame for the result should be shouldered by 
the legislature or by Paulsen himself.41 
Paulsen is a harsh case. The People exercise their sovereign 
powers by voting, the 37 Blaine County residents tried to vote, 
their intent is pretty certain, and yet their ballots were not 
counted. It is much easier to determine the intent of the voters 
who wrote "Paulsen" on the Blaine County sheriff's election bal-
lot than it is to decipher the meaning of an indentation on a 
38. Sec Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13-15-202(3) (governing write-in ballots) & 13-10-
211(1)(a) (describing the requirements for a write-in candidate's declaration of intent); 
Paulsen, 13 P.3d at 934 (reporting that "the 37 rejected ballots ... did not contain a name 
consistent with one of the 30 names submitted by Paulsen in his declaration of intent"). 
39. Paulsen, 13 P.3d at 934. The court noted in its description of its conclusion in 
Marsh v. Overland, 905 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1995), that "both statutory and case law re-
quired that ballots be disallowed unless the intent of electors could be established with 
reasonable certainty from the ballot." I d. at 933. 
40. Paulsen, 13 P.3d at 934 (quoting Spaeth v. Kendall, 801 P.2d 591, 593 (Mont. 
1990) (emphasis added)). 
41. See id at 932 (acknowledging that election laws "can result in seemingly harsh 
consequences, potentially even undermining the will of the majority of voters," but insist-
ing that "[a]mcnding the election statutes is a task for the legislature"); id. at 935-36 
(stressing Paulsen's knowledge of Montana's write-in voting requirements and his failure 
to advise prospective voters about those rules). 
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presidential ballot in Florida. But the Montana court was right 
precisely because the statutory rules governing write-in votes 
were clear, and the contested ballots did not comply with them. 
The contrast with the interpretive approach preferred by the 
Florida Supreme Court is sharp. That court candidly proclaimed 
that voter's intent prevails even if that intent is not expressed 
consistent with the predetermined election rules: "By refusing to 
recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right of a citizen to 
vote for the sake of sacred, unyielding adherence to statutory 
scripture, we would in effect nullify" the right to vote.42 To 
which Michael McConnell has responded, "That is like saying, of 
a disputed umpire call in the World Series: 'Athletic superiority, 
not a hyper-technical reliance upon the rules of baseball, should 
be our guiding principle.' In our system, the will of the people is 
manifested through procedures specified in advance. "43 The in-
terpretive framework for ascertaining that will must be ex-
pressed in advance as well. 
Paulsen is like the statutory interpretation cases in which a 
statute's plain meaning conflicts with other evidence of legisla-
tive intent. Florida chad law, by contrast, does not contain the 
same kind of clear standard of what counts as a vote that is pre-
sent in Montana write-in voting law. The Florida Supreme 
Court's decisions are thus analogous to the statutory interpreta-
tion cases in which the statutory language fails to yield a plain 
meaning. Even textualists will consider other evidence of legis-
lative intent when a statute lacks a plain textual meaning. But a 
general search for legislative intent still troubles textualists be-
cause such intent is speculative and because of the lack of con-
straints on the interpreter of such intent. Those are the same 
concerns articulated by the court in Paulsen: speculation in read-
ing a ballot must be avoided "to insure a standard of objectivity 
in our election process."44 Reasonable guesses about a voter's 
intent can be wrong. Consider an antebellum Alabama case in 
which election officials contacted a voter who explained that he 
did not intend to vote for any candidate for sheriff-even though 
his ballot contained the word "Pence" -much to the chagrin of 
42. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220, 1228 (Fla. 2000) 
(quoting Boardman v. ES!eva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975)), vacated, Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
43. Michael W. McConnell, Supremely Ill-Judged, Wall St. J. A16 (Nov. 24, 2000), 
reprinted in Dionne and Kristol, eels., Bush v. Gore at 198 (cited in note 15). 
44. Paulsen, 13 P.3d at 934 (quoting Spaeth v. Kendall, 801 P.2d 591, 593 (Mont. 
1990)). 
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the unsuccessful candidate Spence.45 Or Bush's argument that 
"[o]ne detached corner of a chad or the impression of the voting 
tool on a chad could mean an intent to vote but could just as eas-
ily mean the voter changed his mind or could merely be a stray 
marking on the ballot." (p. 33) Further, as the Paulsen court 
noted, the speculative nature of any effort to divine the intent of 
a ballot that is not clearly marked raises concerns about the in-
tegrity of the process. That concern has animated election law 
decisions in other states.46 It also lies at the heart of Greene's 
alternative justification for Bush v. Gore, detailed below, that 
sees a "need to police the conscious or unconscious bias of gov-
ernment officials" if "a jurisdiction gives to officials relative~j; 
unconstrained discretion to determine what counts as a vote." 7 
(p. 133) 
My analogy between reading ballots and statutory interpre-
tation presumes that ballots are like statutes. They have much in 
common. At the most general level, both represent attempts at 
communication: a vote for a candidate, or a law governing future 
behavior. As such, both ballots and statutes are the product of 
human actions, and sometimes humans make mistakes. Both the 
marks on ballots and the language contained in statutes can be 
vague or ambiguous. But there are several relevant differences 
between ballots and statutes, too. Some of those differences 
counsel a greater willingness to seek the intent of a voter than 
the intent of the legislature. It should be easier to determine 
voter's intent than legislative intent because a ballot is marked 
45. Spence v. Ninth Judicial Circuit Judge, 13 Ala. 805 (1848). The court explained 
that "the managers of the precinct where it was given, on the evening of the day of the 
election, on counting out the votes, called on the voter to know if he intended by it to 
vote for Spence. He then stated he did not, that he did not intend to vote for sheriff at 
all, and therefore had written on his ticket the word Pence. After this declaration, made 
by the voter, we think the managers properly refused to count this vote."). Id at 811. 
46. See Curtis v. Bindeman, 261 A.2d 515, 517 (D.C. 1970) (reading an election 
statute "with a view to insuring that the results are not fraught with dishonesty or the 
appearance of unreliability"); Hathcoat v. Pendleton Election Bd., 622 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that "[t]he purpose of strict adherence to the general 
rule [requiring both a mark and name on a write-in ballot], especially within the context 
of elections, is to ensure the integrity of the process and to give effect to the will of the 
people"). See also Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 33 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting 
in part) (observing that "[c]harges or suspicions of inadvertent or intentional alteration, 
however baseless, will infect the case" once ballots are recounted by election officials). 
47. Additionally, as Jonathan Rauch observes, "hand counts under conditions of 
extreme partisanship and stress almost inevitably raise suspicion. Machines err, and they 
may well be more error-prone than people. But machines don't carry party membership 
cards." Jonathan Rauch, Hands Off" Why Florida Election Law Isn't So Crazy After All, 
New Republic 24-26 (Dec. 4, 2000), reprinted in Dionne and Kristol, eds., Bush v. Gore 
at 202 (cited in note 15). 
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by an individual, which avoids the problems of ascertaining the 
collective intent of the members of the legislature that enacts a 
statute. Machine error is far more likely to affect ballots than 
statutes. Another justification for a textualist approach to statu-
tory interpretation is that the legislature is capable of, and 
should be held responsible for, correcting its own mistakes. At 
first glance, this is a grossly insensitive argument to extend to the 
interpretation of ballots, where many mistakes result from mis-
functioning equipment or from voters acting in good faith who 
nonetheless err. This distinction can be significantly minimized, 
though, by the kinds of voter instructions that I discuss below. 
On the other hand, some of the differences between ballots and 
statutes favor less willingness to consider voter's intent than leg-
islative intent. A ballot should be easier to decipher than statu-
tory language. Both can be unclear, but a punch card ballot with 
a chad punched out is clearer than even the most lucid words 
that are contained in a statute, while there are relatively few ex-
planations for an indented chad compared to the multiple expla-
nations for why a majority of the legislature approved a provi-
sion in a statute. Repeated handling can compromise the ability 
to read ballots, but not statutes.48 And the kind of evidence that 
could offer an insight into a voter's intent-other indented 
chads, party-line voting-is much less helpful than the commit-
tee reports, congressional debates, and other materials that are 
employed to discern legislative intent. In short, the differences 
between ballots and statutes point in opposite directions, and the 
similarities between ballots and statutes suggest that the same 
approach to their interpretation makes sense after all. 
Back in Florida, the undifferentiated effort to rely on the in-
tent of the voter as the lodestar for judging a ballot ultimately 
failed. Bush argued that there was no clear standard for deter-
mining what counted as a vote, that the most generous rendering 
of what counted as a vote was improper, and that the Florida 
Supreme Court failed to honor the statutory discretion that the 
law gave to those officials counting (and recounting) the ballots. 
In other words, Bush objected to the process as speculative and 
lacking objectivity-the very failings that doomed the recount 
request in Paulsen. The speculation occurred because the 
county boards were left to their own devices in trying to ascer-
tain the intent of a voter whose ballot contained an indented or 
48. See Roudebush v. Harrke, 405 U.S. 15, 32-33 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in 
part) (warnmg that each review of contested ballots Will threaten the integrity of the bal-
lots). 
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hanging chad on a ballot. The missing "standard of objectivity" 
was evidenced in the Republican criticism of Gore "for seeking 
manual recounts in heavily Democratic precincts and for select-
ing heavily Democratic precincts in those counties for the initial 
manual recount."49 (p. 45) Objectivity further suffered because 
voter's intent was determined by "the disparate and unguided 
subjective opinion of a partisan (two members are elected in par-
tisan voting) canvassing board" once those precincts were cho-
sen.50 The collective weight of those concerns finally manifested 
itself in Bush v. Gore. 
I submit that election law needs a clear standard for reading 
ballots that is uniformly applied. It is not enough to have the 
rules established before an election; the rules themselves must 
be sufficiently clear to minimize any post-election disputes about 
what counts as a vote. Election statutes should thus adopt a tex-
tualist approach to interpreting ballots. Such an approach will 
provide a bright-line rule governing what counts as a "vote" that 
avoids the post-election controversies about that question that 
plagued the presidential election in Florida. The bright line 
must be accompanied by aggressive voter education programs 
that teach voters what they must do for their actions to count as 
a "vote," and by affording voters the opportunity to confirm 
their actions before their ballots are submitted. Florida illus-
trates both proposals. Broward County instructed voters to 
"[p]unch the stylus straight down throufth the ballot card for the 
candidates or issues of your choice." 1 Palm Beach County 
added, "[a]fter voting, check your ballot card to be sure your 
voting sections are clearly and cleanly punched and there are no 
chips left hanging on the back of the card."52 Or, to cite a final 
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has suggested that 
"perhaps in recognition that voters might change their minds, 
the Legislature included the requirement of punching the ballot 
49. As Greene notes, Judge Tjoflat complained that the Florida Supreme Court 
allowed Gore to "cherry-pick" the most favorable venues for him to seek additional 
"votes" (p. 78, quoting Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1143 (11th Cir. 2000) (en 
bane) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)). Judge Tjoflat also asserted that "a candidate is more 
likely to have his request for a manual count granted, and to receive favorable interpreta-
tions of voter intent, in counties where the candidate shares a political party affiliation 
with the majority of the canvassing board." Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1144 (Tjoflat, J., dis-
senting). 
50. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1191 (11th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (Birch, J., dis-
senting). 
51. Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1141 n.19 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(quoting the county instructions). 
52. !d. 
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[in addition to writing in a candidate's name] to identify an act 
that unambiguously expresses the voters' final choice."53 
The Montana Supreme Court would endorse this approach 
to interpreting ballots, but as Greene observes, the Florida Su-
preme Court and most other state courts have accepted a gener-
alized emphasis upon voter's intent. (pp. 37-42) Since the 2000 
presidential election, a more textualist approach to interpreting 
ballots has gained favor. Florida amended its election laws to 
require "a clear indication on the ballot that the voter has made 
a definite choice" in order to count as a vote.54 The ensuing 
regulations for each type of voting system must strike a balance 
that avoids "a catch-all provision that fails to identify specific 
standards" and a requirement that "the voter must properly 
mark or designate his or her choice on the ballot. "55 The Florida 
reform was endorsed by the National Commission on Federal 
Election Reform, a bipartisan commission headed by former 
Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. The commission 
recommended that "[e]ach state should adopt uniform statewide 
standards for defining what will constitute a vote on each cate-
gory of voting equipment certified for use in that state. "56 The 
commission further recommended that "the definition of a vote 
should be as objective as possible and spelled out in clear lan-
guage before Election Day."57 By contrast, the commission 
warned that "[a]morphous statutory references to the 'intent of 
the voter' invite still more divinations. "58 Like Florida, though, 
the commission advised that "some allowance be made for at 
least some voter errors that nonetheless indicate a clear 
choice."59 The commission's recommendations and Florida law 
thus move toward a textualist approach to interpreting ballots, 
but they stop short of accepting the ballot's "text" as always dis-
positive. In this respect, they resemble the textualist theory of 
statutory interpretation of Justice Scalia, who admits of certain 
limited instances in which the literal text of a statute may not 
control.60 
53. In re Municipal Election Held on May 10, 1994, for Three Positions on the 
Sparta Township Council, 656 A.2d 5, 8 (N.J. 1995). 
54. Florida Election Reform Act,§ 42 (adding Fla. Stat. § 102.166). 
55. Id. 
56. The National Commission on Federal Election Reform: To Assure Pride and 
Confidence in the Electoral Process 61 (Aug. 2001). 
57. Id. at 60. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 62 . 
. . 60. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 44-47 (cited in note 27) (criti-
CIZing Jushce Scalia's acceptance of an absurd results exception to his textualist theory); 
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Of course, I am not so naive as to imagine that any standard 
will eliminate all potential questions about the meaning of any 
particular ballot. My point is simply that an objective standard 
for what qualifies as a "vote" that is in place before election day 
is the best way to avoid the kinds of legal battles that raged last 
fall in Florida. If a voter who is instructed how to vote and re-
minded to check his or her ballot before submitting it nonethe-
less produces a confusing ballot, then the dangers of speculation 
and bias that plague subsequent examination of that ballot jus-
tify its exclusion. Any more subjective approach to counting 
votes is likely to fail. For while the absence of a standard distin-
guished the indented Florida chads from the rejected write-in 
ballots cast in Paulsen, it doomed the recount effort in Bush v. 
Gore. 
III. THE EXPLANATIONS FOR BUSH V. GORE 
So did the Florida Supreme Court's inability to satisfactorily 
define what counts as a "vote" justify Bush v. Gore? Greene 
points out that seven members of the Court agreed that there 
was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause. (p. 117) Three members of the Court concluded 
that the state court's actions also violated 3 U.S.C. § 2. The 
Court then divided 5-4 in its interpretation of Florida law regard-
ing the consequences of the equal protection violation. As 
Greene explains, the majority determined that the Florida Su-
preme Court held that the state intended to reach the safe har-
bor provided by 3 U.S.C. § 2, and since the Court reached that 
conclusion two hours before the safe harbor was to close, the 
Court held that further recounts were precluded. (pp. 120-22) 
Greene skillfully explains that the majority cited the wrong part 
of the Florida Supreme Court opinion for that proposition, but 
he then collects other statements of the state court-statements 
that were overlooked by the Court's majority-to conclude that 
"it is reasonable to suggest that the Florida Supreme Court 
thought that all manual recounts must end no later than Decem-
ber 12."61 (p. 123) Greene would have favored yet another op-
John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2209,2229-30 (1995) (reviewing Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (cited in note 
27)) (analyzing the absurd results rule). I am increasingly skeptical whether any such 
exception to a textualist theory of statutory interpretation is necessary or advisable. S~e 
John Copeland Nagle, Textualism's Exceptions, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation, Article 15 <http://www.bepress.com/ilsliss3/art15> (2002) 
61. In addition to the parts of the Florida Supreme Court opinions cited by Greene, 
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tion, remanding to the state court for a determination of whether 
Florida law did in fact seek the safe harbor. (p. 125) But, as 
Greene emphasizes, the issue posed by that remedial question 
was one of state law.62 Never has the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of a question of state law been so contro-
versial. 
Even though he would have preferred a remand, Greene 
concludes that the result in Bush v. Gore was plausible. Others 
have not been so charitable. Alan Dershowitz has written about 
"the culpability of those justices who hijacked Election 2000 by 
distorting the law, violating their own expressed principles, and 
using their robes to bring about a partisan result. "63 Suzanna 
Sherry has said that Bush v. Gore "appears to be a nakedly po-
litical decision that arrogates all power to the Supreme Court 
and attempts to ensure that the five Justices in the majority will 
be joined by ideologically similar colleagues appointed by a Re-
publican President."64 Over five hundred law professors signed 
an advertisement published in the New York Times proclaiming 
that "the five justices were acting as political proponents for 
candidate Bush, not as judges. "65 
sec William Glabcrson, Boies's Concession on "Deadline" Proved Fatal, N.Y. Times 
(Dec. 14, 2000), reprinted in 36 Days at 334-36 (cited in note 31) (discussing the implica-
tions of the concession by Gore's attorney at oral argument in the Florida Supreme 
Court that the Florida vote count must be completed by December 12). 
62. Unless, as Greene explains, "the state court understood the safe-harbor provi-
sion as mandatory rather than conditional, and thus that the state lacked the authority to 
count votes past December 12." (p. 125) 
63. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 12 (cited in note 5). Dcrshowitz makes it ab-
solutely clear that he is accusing the majority justices "of partisan favoritism-bias-
toward one litigant and against another." Id. at llO. 
64. Suzanna Sherry, The 2000 Presidential Election: What Happens When Law and 
Politics Collide?, 31 Vand. Lawyer 20,22 (2001). 
65. 637 Law Professors Say By Stopping the Vote Count in Florida, The U.S. Su-
preme Court Used Its Power To Act as Political Partisans, Not Judges of a Court of Law, 
N.Y. Times A7 (Jan. 13, 2000) (advertisement). For additional charges of partisanship, 
see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 
Yale L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001) ("That the conservative Justices acted as they did suggested 
that their partisanship was so thorough and pervasive that it blinded them to their own 
biases."); Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, New Republic 18 (Dec. 
25, 2000), reprinted in Dionne and Kristol, eds., Bush v. Gore at 312 (cited in note 15) 
(claiming that the decision "made it impossible for citizens of the United States to sustain 
any kind of faith in the rule of law as something larger than the self-interested political 
preferences of William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Anthony Kennedy, 
and Sandra Day O'Connor"); Mary McGrory, Supreme Travesty of Justice, Wash. Post 
A3 (Dec. 14, 2000), reprinted in Dionne and Kristol, eds., Bush v. Gore at 295 (cited in 
note 15) (referring to "Justice Antonin Scalia, who might as well have been wearing a 
Bush button on his robes"); Linda Greenhouse, The Court's Credibility at Risk, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 11, 2000), reprinted in 36 Days at 290 (cited in note 31) (quoting Terrance 
Sandalow as describing the Court's stay order as "an unmistakably partisan decision 
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The rhetoric employed in the assaults on Bush v. Gore is 
unusually harsh, but it is not the first case to generate complaints 
that the Court's written opinion failed to explain the actual basis 
for a decision. Consider another characterization of an opinion 
as a "failure" because "it so lacks persuasive methodological 
power as to raise questions ... about the Court's candor in iden-
tifying the real reasons why five Justices voted as they did." 
That was Philip Frickey's description of United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 66 in which the Court held that Title VII per-
mitted voluntary affirmative action programs. Frickey pro-
ceeded to suggest that the decision could be defended, but by an 
alternative argument advanced in Justice Wisdom's dissent in 
the Fifth Circuit.67 
In that spirit, Greene argues that the result in Bush v. Gore 
would have been better grounded in the First Amendment. As 
he explains: 
In many freedom-of-speech and freedom-of-the-press cases, 
the Court has insisted that, when law gives discretion to public 
officials, that discretion must be bounded by clear, objective 
criteria. For example, if city law gives a city official power to 
grant or deny parade permits, or power to grant or deny re-
quests to use loudspeakers at a city hall gathering, that law 
will be upheld only if it sets forth detailed, neutral, objective 
standards for granting or denying the requests. Otherwise, if 
the law says, essentially, "grant or deny as best serves the pub-
lic interest," then the official has an enormous opportunity, 
consciously or unconsciously, to help speakers whose views 
she favors and to harm speakers whose views she disfavors. 
Although the Court has never applied this line of cases in the 
voting rights setting, voting rights share with speech and press 
rights a core political nature- they are all part of our essential 
citizenship; they are what allow us, rather than officials, to 
remain in control of government. The concern in Florida that 
different officials would count votes in different ways based 
on the vague "voter's intent" standard was a concern with 
roots in these free-speech and free-press cases. 
This understanding would allow the Court's key holding in 
Bush v. Gore to have a powerful but limited scope of applica-
tion in future cases .... If one moves away from the stated 
without any foundation in law"). 
66. 443 u.s. 193 (1979). 
67. The piece, which is excellent, is PhilipP. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 Tulane 
L. Rev. 1169,1177 (2000). 
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equal protection basis for the outcome, and instead adopts the 
First Amendment analysis offered here, then only a certain 
type of differentiation among voting and vote-counting meth-
ods would have to be invalidated. Courts should step in, un-
der the First Amendment theory, only when a jurisdiction 
gives to officials relatively unconstrained discretion to deter-
mine what counts as a vote. For only in that setting do we 
need to police the conscious or unconscious bias of govern-
ment officials. (pp. 132-33) 
509 
This is the best theoretical defense of the result in Bush v. Gore 
that I have encountered. It captures the essence of Bush's com-
plaints about the vote counting process in Florida: government 
officials were allowed to employ a vague standard (actually, 
vague standards) to judge the meaning of a ballot. Vagueness 
challenges abound in the law, afflicting such disparate standards 
as the meaning of air pollution, hostile work environments, un-
reasonable noises, and obscenity. The Due Process Clause pro-
hibits any legal standard that fails to adequately inform those 
who are subject to it, but constitutional objections to vague legal 
standards are likely to succeed only if the First Amendment is 
implicated.68 Voting might implicate the First Amendment, for 
voting possesses many of the same expressive characteristics of 
the speech protected by the First Amendment. 69 While the 
nexus between counting votes and the First Amendment cases 
prohibiting standardless government decisions may be unprece-
dented, as Greene admits, it is worthy of considerable further at-
tention. 
Greene's alternative explanation is attractive, but there is 
no indication that the Court ever entertained it. The persistence 
of the charges that the Court acted for purely partisan political 
motives presumes that such judicial misconduct is the only other 
way to explain why the Court actually reached the result that it 
did. Surely, though, there are a range of additional explanations 
68. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) ("A statute can be imper-
missibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails to provide people of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. 
Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."); 
Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 51 (Foundation Press, 1998) (explaining that 
"(t]he vagueness rule is related to the Court's longtime concern over standardless admin-
istrative discretion in speech cases"). 
69. See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of 
Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process 360 (2d ed. 2001) (asserting that 
"(t]he idea of locating a right to vote in the First Amendment guarantee of free speech 
has a distinguished pedigree," citing Alexander Bickel and Alexander Meiklejohn, but 
admitting that "the Supreme Court seems to have rejected the argument"). 
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besides bias even if one is not convinced by the reasoning con-
tained in the opinion. I would like to sketch three such explana-
tions here. 
The first explanation sees Bush v. Gore as the consequence 
of the decision nearly fifty years before to treat claims regarding 
the structure of elections as justiciable under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Prior to the 1960's, the Court repeatedly rebuffed 
efforts to employ the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate the 
manner in which states chose to structure their electoral proc-
esses. The Equal Protection Clause prohibited discrimination 
based on race or other protected characteristics, but general re-
apportionment claims were treated as presenting nonjusticiable 
political questions. That approach disappeared with Baker v. 
Carr,70 where the Court held that reapportionment claims were 
justiciable. Tellingly, the critics of Baker foreshadowed the 
complaints about Bush v. Gore. Justice Frankfurter worried 
about the lack of "guidelines for formulating specific, definite, 
wholly unprecedented remedies" for newly acknowledged equal 
protection violations.71 He reminded that "there is not under 
our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, 
for every undesirable exercise of legislative power."72 Likewise, 
Justice Harlan wrote that "[t]hose observers of the Court who 
see it primarily as the last refuge for the correction of all inequal-
ity or injustice, no matter what its nature or source, will no doubt 
applaud this decision and its break with the past. Those who 
consider that continuing national respect for the Court's author-
ity depends in large measure upon its wise exercise of self-
restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication, will view 
the decision with deep concern."73 Again, Justice Frankfurter: 
the doctrines of standing and political questions teach "that 
courts are not fit instruments of decision where what is essen-
tially at stake is the composition of those large contests of policy 
traditionally fought out in non-judicial forums, by which gov-
ernments and the actions of governments are made and un-
made."74 Justice Frankfurter also warned that "[t]he Court's au-
thority- possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanc-
tion. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete 
70. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
71. ld. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
72. !d. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
73. ld. at 339-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
74. !d. at 287 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entangle-
ments and by abstention from injectin~ itself into the clash of po-
litical forces in political settlements." Baker was, in one com-
mentator's words, "politics in search of law. "76 Yet none of this 
deterred the majority from concluding that the courts could ad-
judicate equal protection challenges to the manner in which elec-
toral districts are designed. Indeed, Deputy Attorney General 
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach defended Baker as "a great example 
of the rule of law in our society" even in the teeth of the com-
plaints that the Court had acted too politically.77 The reaction to 
Baker's expansion of equal protection jurisprudence into ques-
tions of electoral structure thus elicited the same reaction as 
Bush v. Gore. The decision in Bush v. Gore does not follow in-
evitably from Baker and its progeny, but it would have been im-
possible without them. 
A second explanation is that Bush v. Gore is Romer v. Ev-
an/8 redux. In Romer, the Court held 6-3 that a state constitu-
tional amendment adopted by the people of Colorado that pro-
hibited government action to protect gays or lesbians violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. That result pleased many and infu-
riated others, which is only the first similarity to Bush v. Gore. 
Three aspects of the equal protection analysis in Romer are ech-
oed in Bush v. Gore. First, the majority in Romer relied upon an 
intuitive sense of what is unequal. Second, it cited few prece-
dents for its decision, while ignorin~ or struggling to distinguish 
those arguably least favorable to it. 9 Third, it emphasized the 
novelty of the contested law, implying that the unprecedented 
nature of the challenged action provided cause for suspicion 
about its constitutionality. 80 There are other parallels as well. 
75. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
76. Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 252. Pro-
fessor Neal described Baker as resulting from "a fragmented Court, an abrupt reversal of 
position, unexplored and debatable substantive principles, and the contemplation of 
remedies as novel as they are drastic." ld. at 253. 
77. Nicholas deB. Katzen bach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 
829,836 (1962). 
78. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
79. The majority sought to distinguish Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (up· 
holding a state constitutional amendment that denied polygamists the right to vote), but 
it failed to persuade Justice Scalia. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (describing reliance 
upon Beason as "misplaced") with id. at 649-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (developing the 
analogy to Beason). The majority did not cite Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
(rejecting a due process challenge to the application of a state sodomy law to homosexual 
activity). 
80. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (explaining that the "disqualification of a class of 
persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our 
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The equal protection reasoning in both cases held a particular 
appeal to Justice Kennedy. 81 Less impressed, supporters of both 
decisions scrambled to identify alternative theories for the 
Court's result.82 Critics of both decisions charged that the Court 
had fashioned a rule that would not be applied in future cases.83 
Indeed, since it was decided, Romer has not heralded a profound 
change in equal protection jurisprudence, in the constitutional 
authority of states to restrict local governments, or even in the 
constitutional treatment of gays and lesbians. So where Baker 
suggests that Bush v. Gore is just the most recent in a line of 
cases extending judicial control over elections via the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, Romer suggests that Bush v. Gore was a unique 
response to its unprecedented facts. 
A third explanation for Bush v. Gore is that the Court was 
outraged by the actions of the Florida Supreme Court. Or, to 
put it another way, perhaps the Court acted to prevent the state 
courts from deciding the election. The premise of this view, of 
course, is that the Florida Supreme Court acted wrongly in its 
decisions regarding the meaning of a "vote," the authority of the 
various state bodies involved in counting the votes, the scope 
and nature of a recount, and the appropriate remedies for any 
errors. Greene acknowledges that Bush's narrow understanding 
of what should have counted as "the rejection of legal votes" was 
"perhaps even stronger than the reading the state high court ul-
timately adopted" (p. 127); others have been much more insis-
tent that the Florida court's decisions were unjustifiable. An 
emphasis upon the perceived outrageousness of the Florida Su-
preme Court's decisions is featured in the post-election analyses 
of Judge Posner, James Blumstein, and others. 84 Moreover, 
j urisprudcncc "). 
81. J usticcs Kennedy and O'Connor were the only members of the Court to join in 
the majority in both Romer and Bush v. Gore. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion or the 
Court in Romer, and Greene suggests that the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore "was 
almost certainly written by either Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, or both, because 
they arc the only Justices who didn't join one or the concurring or dissenting opinions." 
(pp. 116-17) 
82. Sec, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 
Mich. L. Rev. 203 (1996) (arguing that Amendment 2 violated the attainder clause). 
83. Sec Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of "in-
venting a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine"). 
84. Sec Posner, 68 U. of Chi. L. Rev. at 719 (cited in note 35) (observing "that the 
Florida court was acting arbitrarily was the premise of the equal protection argument 
that the Supreme Court eventually accepted, and that it was acting in violation of Florida 
law was the premise of the Article II argument that three Justices found persuasive and 
that I consider the stronger of the two arguments"); James F. Blumstein, The 2000 Presi-
dential Presidential Election: What Happens When Law and Politics Collide?, 31 Vand. 
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there is evidence that the Court shared these concerns. Greene 
notes the significance of the Court's December 4 decision to va-
cate the original Florida Supreme Court decision because of 
questions about its reasoning, and the concerns about the unre-
sponsiveness of the state court that Justice O'Connor expressed 
at oral argument in Bush v. Gore. (pp. 106-07) On this reading, 
it was the perception that the Florida Supreme Court was seek-
ing to elect Gore that provoked Bush v. Gore, rather than an af-
firmative desire by the majority to elect Bush. 
But even if these criticisms of the Florida Supreme Court 
are correct, they still do not necessarily justify the U.S. Supreme 
Court's reversal in Bush v. Gore. David Strauss has dismissed 
such a defense of the Court's decision by noting that "the best 
that can be said is that the Court trumped the supposed lawless-
ness of the Florida Supreme Court with lawlessness of its own. "85 
More simply, two wrongs do not make a right. The legal em-
bodiment of that aphorism is contained in principles of federal 
jurisdiction that prevent the federal courts, including the Su-
preme Court, from engaging in a roving attempt to correct every 
judicial mistake, even-or perhaps especially-when the election 
of the President is at stake. It is easy to imagine Justice Scalia 
writing an opinion acknowledging the travesty of justice worked 
by the Florida Supreme Court but insisting that the federal 
courts do not sit to remedy all wrongs. Thus critics object both 
to the Court's substantive rationale and to its decision to decide 
the case in the first place. That is the most powerful argument 
against Bush v. Gore, and I am not expert enough in the law of 
federal courts or equal protection jurisprudence to fairly evalu-
ate it here. Note, :_hough, that this analysis shifts the question to 
whether the Court was right, which is a much different query 
than whether the Court was so wrong to justify the accusations 
of partisan bias that have been leveled against it. 
Greene's answer is that the Court acted within the bounds 
of reason. He sees the Court's termination of the election in 
Bush v. Gore as "the most difficult challenge for the thesis that 
all the rulings from the 2000 election were based in reason." (p. 
182) "Yet," he adds, "even here, the majority opinion has the 
Lawyer 23 (2001) (concluding that "the Florida Supreme Court's ... work product is the 
necessary foundation for evaluating the [United States Supreme Court's] role in the 2000 
Florida election cases"). 
85. David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
737, 756 (2001). Accord Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 8 (cited in note 5); Frank L 
Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679, 690-92 (2001 ). 
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shape and sound of law .... It amounts to an act of legal inter-
pretation." (p. 182) That interpretation may have been wrong, 
just like numerous other interpretations, but error does not con-
note bias. The many explanations for the result in Bush v. 
Gore-the per curiam opinion's equal protection argument, the 
concurrence's Article II argument, Greene's First Amendment 
argument, the "avoidance of a national crisis" justification,86 and 
the three explanations that I have briefly sketched here-all con-
tradict the assumption that politics triumphed over law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The best chapter of Greene's book is the last. In it he trum-
pets the election as the victory of the rule of law. He emphasizes 
that the election battles proceeded "in law-like fashion. Reasons 
were given that were defensible from statutory text or judicial 
precedent; opposing views were canvassed and rejected through 
argument; difficult questions were resolved by reference to prin-
ciple, rather than politics." (pp. 182-82) To be sure, the events 
were often traumatic, but Greene has an explanation for that, 
too: 
What happened in Florida was this: Forms of law became ex-
posed to an intense nationwide scrutiny. Anything upon 
which the entire nation's attention is turned, via the over-
whelming resources of the contemporary media, will look 
scarred, imperfect, unclean. This is so whether the item under 
the microscope is a politician's sex life, a famous athlete's al-
leged crime, or the system of electing presidents. The resolu-
tion of the 2000 presidential election turned on one state, and 
the resolution in that one state turned on an enormously 
complex interaction of politics and law. Of course, the law, 
under such scrutiny, will look imperfect and hard to distin-
guish from the politics. But that doesn't mean it is any less 
principled or that it serves any less as a peacekeeping device. 
(pp. 180-81) 
86. Chief Justice Wells was the first to warn that "there is a real and present likeli-
hood that this constitutional crisis will do substantial damage to our country, our state, 
and to this Court as an institution," while predicting that "this system of county-by-
county decisions regarding how a dimpled chad is counted is fraught with equal protec-
tion concerns which will eventually cause the election results in Florida to be stricken by 
the federal courts or Congress." Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1263, 1267 (Fla. 2000) 
(Wells, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Since then, several 
commentators have suggested that the Court ruled in Bush v. Gore to avoid a constitu-
tional crisis. Sec Michelman, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 692-93 (cited in note 85); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Order Without Law, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 757, 758, 768, 772-73 (2001); John C. Yoo, 
In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775,789-91 (2001). 
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The choice of the President could have been decided by vi_o-
lence, Greene reminds us, but it was decided by law instead.87 
(pp. 180, 183) 
Greene's contrast between law and violence as the means of 
influencing policy within the United States proved to be pro-
phetic. Two hundred seventy-three days after it was decided, 
Bush v. Gore suddenly seemed like a distant memory when 2,801 
people were killed in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon. The attacks did not in any sense 
change the rightness or the wrongness of the Court's decision, 
and the national response undoubtedly would have been the 
same if Gore had become President, but the attacks placed the 
election in an entirely different perspective. They reminded us 
how unusual it is for a society to accept a controversial transfer 
of governmental power without even a threat of violence. They 
made the more apocalyptic language about Bush v. Gore-
language that Greene skillfully avoided-sound out of place. 
And the attacks produced a sense of national unity that had not 
been seen in recent generations. The People answered the ques-
tions about the divisions within the United States. This time 
they did not need the Supreme Court to figure out what they 
said. 
87. Accord Issacharoff, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 637 (cited in note 23) (observing that 
"there was essentially no social unrest, no crisis of governance, no inability to maintain 
discipline in foreign affairs, no instability in financial markets, no crisis in consumer mar-
kets, no stockpiling of goods, and so forth. Instead, there was a captivating display of 
high-powered lawyering that seized the national spotlight and resolved what in much of 
human history would have been an invitation to disorder and despair."). 
